Enhanced security culture requires virtually Sherlock Holmes's ability to use observation and logic to identify where the chance of loss at work is. As Sherlock is looking for a crime, the OHS expert must be sensitive and aware of the fine traces that are not necessarily visible in the work environment. While workplace risk analysis provides the structure and nature of individual workplace risks and risks by providing opportunities for work interviews (steps and tasks, tools / equipment / materials, working environment, current policies, procedures, etc.) , IBs are insufficient to ensure that the checks are restored. Improving Human Performance According to the US Human Resources Improvement manual, 80% of the loss-making events are due to human error and 20% due to faults in equipment. However, a further 80% analysis shows that 70% of human errors are due to organizational weakness and 30% due to human error. This 70% means "perceived shortcomings in organizational processes, equipment, or values that create working conditions that cause errors or deteriorate control integrity." These latent faults are embedded in the body.
The Atomic Research Institute (INPO) study refers to nine common weaknesses that serve as a warning flag for "serious incidents" and a Security culture. INPO "concluded that these latent relationships will help to break down and accumulation of faulty controls and human performance events." These are warning flags that prevent the checks. Nine Warning Banners That Can Conquer Controls in a Security Culture While writing this manual for nuclear energy operations, you use flags to interpret your workplace with just a little bit of interpretation. Find the signs of the following nine flags that are in the DOE manual:
- Excessive confidence – "Numbers" are good and the staff lives in the past. As a result, staff are not familiar with low-level problems and do not know the dangers.
- Isolationism – There is little interaction with other organizations, professional groups, regulators and industry groups. Benchmarking is seldom or is limited to "industrial tourism", without doing good practices. As a result, the organization is far behind in the industry and does not know about it.
- Defense and Opposite Relationships – The mind towards regulatory agencies or professional groups is defensive or "minimal". Internal to the organization, employees are not involved and are not listening to and the issues raised are not appreciated. Contrary links hinder open communication
- Informal operations and weak technique – There are no operational standards, formalities and discipline. Other themes, initiatives or special projects reflect the operation of the plant. Engineering activity is weak, usually lacking in talent or lack of alignment with operational priorities. The design base is not primary and the design margins are deteriorating over time
- Production Priorities – Important mounting problems are delayed and repairs are postponed until the plant remains in production or during production. Safety is assumed and not explicitly emphasized in staff interactions and on-site communication.
- Inappropriate Change Management – Organizational changes, staff reductions, retirement programs and relocations are started before we take full account of their effects. Recruitment or training can not be used to compensate for the changes. Processes and procedures do not support robust performance as a result of management changes
- Plant Operations Events – The significance of the Event causing the loss is unknown or underperformed, and the response to events and unsafe conditions is not aggressive. The causes of organizing the events are not deeply explored.
- Effective Leaders – Managers are defensive, no teamwork or weak communicators. Leaders do not have integrated plant knowledge or operational experience. Senior executives are not involved in operations and do not exercise accountability or follow-up.
- Lack of self-criticism – Surveillance organizations do not have an impeccable external view or just provide good news. Self-assessment processes, such as management monitoring programs, do not find or address problems; Or the results did not go in time to make a difference. "
Security culture and process development The body is faith, the materials in use, the people, the social, physical and social environment needed to attain the goal – the cause of existence. Depth understanding and knowledge of all aspects of the organization, not only the security rules and compliance criteria, so that environmental, safety and healthcare processes are more likely to contribute to a successful culture of security in the long run
Ministry of Energy Human Resources Development Manual, DOE-Roughton, James, Nathan Crutchfield, Job Hazard Analysis, Guidelines for Compliance and beyond, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008
Roughton, James, Developing Effective Security Culture Ure: Approach, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2002.
Source by James Roughton